Chris Ward wanted to be a judge in the state trial court in Will County, Illinois. Circuit court judges are elected by popular vote in Illinois, so Ward filed a candidacy petition to run in the primary. But when he filed, he did not live in the subcircuit he filed in.

Daniel Goodman, husband of one of Ward’s primary opponents, filed an objection to Ward’s candidacy petition. Goodman argued Ward was ineligible to run for judge in a subcircuit he did not live in when the petition was filed.

The Will County electoral board agreed with Ward and ruled that Ward could appear on the election ballot. Goodman appealed the board’s decision to the circuit (trial level) court, which agreed with him, and precluded Ward from the ballot. Ward then took the case to the Illinois Appellate Court, which also agreed with Goodman.

Old Town Development sued a slew of companies for fraud and breach of fiduciary duties in operating Old Town Development. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded Old Town over $1 million compensatory damages and three times that for punitive damages.

The defendant companies appealed. The appellate court’s opinion is instructive on the standards of review for the various aspects of a punitive damages award.

The first part of the punitive damages test was whether “punitive damages were available as a matter of law [under] plaintiff’s cause of action.” The appellate court ruled that its standard of review was de novo (no discretion to the trial court). In this case, the First District Illinois Court of Appeals ruled, a breach of fiduciary duty action could support a claim for punitive damages.

Leon Aylward claimed his doctor, Michael Settecase, and the medical clinic that employed him, failed to timely diagnose Aylward’s lung cancer. After Aylward sued them for malpractice, the clinic asked the trial court for permission to talk to other clinic employees who had been involved with Aylward’s treatment, but had not been sued. The clinic argued it should be allowed to have private conversations with the employees because Aylward could sue them later, and as defendants the clinic’s lawyers could talk to them privately.

The trial court denied the request, but certified the question to allow an immediate appeal. The appellate court accepted the immediate appeal, but Aylward asked for it to be dismissed. He argued that it was not a proper interlocutory appeal because it called for an advisory opinion to a hypothetical question – i.e., it was hypothetical that the employees would be sued.

The First District Illinois Appellate Court disagreed because, “Answering this question will have an immediate effect upon the discovery process by determining whether MPG [clinic] is permitted to represent the MPG employees, and thus, its resolution may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

Three corporate taxpayers disputed the amount of property taxes they owed Cook County, Illinois. So they sued the county collector for refunds plus interest. The taxpayers settled the property valuation part of their disputes, but left the interest issues (power to award, rate, and period the interest accumulated) for the trial court to decide. The trial court awarded the taxpayers interest at a favorable rate and period.

The Collector appealed before the trial court decided the interest rate to be applied to two of the property valuation judgments. The first question was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to award interest even though the Collector already appealed.

The general rule is that a trial court loses jurisdiction over a case as soon as a notice of appeal is filed. The chief exception to the rule is that a trial court still can issue orders that are collateral to the judgment. In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the interest awards were collateral to the valuation judgments, so the trial court kept jurisdiction to award interest. Here’s how the supreme court explained it:

John O’Brien sued his wife for divorce. The case was transferred to a second trial judge. About one year after that transfer, John claimed the trial judge was biased. So John asked for a substitution of judge. The request for another judge was denied.

John appealed from the trial court’s maintenance award and the denial of his request for substitution of judge. But his notice of appeal did not state that he was appealing from the denial of his substitution request. Nonetheless, the Second District Illinois Appellate Court considered the question.

The case went to the Illinois Supreme Court on a certificate of importance. The supreme court first considered whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the substitution question. John’s wife argued there was no appellate jurisdiction because John’s notice of appeal “did not specify or indicate that John was seeking to appeal from the order denying the substitution …”

Michael and Rose A’Hearn divorced in 2006. But their lawsuit did not end there. About two years later, Michael filed for two rules to show cause, complaining that Rose was interfering with Michael’s visitation and that she was engaging in immoral behavior. After mediation, Michael and Rose agreed on communication with and visitation of the child, but not on custody.

A month later, Michael filed a petition to modify custody. But the trial court later barred Michael’s witnesses because he had not disclosed them timely. Without witnesses, Michael’s custody petition was dismissed. Rose then filed a petition to extend maintenance and family support. Rose’s petitions were pending when Michael appealed the dismissal of his custody petition.

The first question was whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider Michael’s appeal, even though Rose’s petitions still were pending. The Third District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that it had jurisdiction because Michael’s custody petition was a new action, making its dismissal final and appealable.

Sheila and Marissa Brown were witnesses to a homicide. In mid-December 2009 they were subpoenaed to testify to a grand jury just six days later. But the Browns said they did not have time to effectively communicate with a lawyer before the grand jury proceeding, and that they had previously made plans to travel out of town. So two days before they were scheduled to testify they asked the trial court to postpone their appearances until after the new year.

The trial court denied the Browns’ request because they did not present “an urgent matter.” The Browns appealed the next day. When they did not appear for their testimony to the grand jury, the State filed a petition to hold the Browns in contempt. The Browns asked the trial court to stay State’s contempt request while the appeal was pending. The trial court refused.

The Second District Illinois Appellate Court dismissed the Browns’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court ruled that “An order denying a motion to continue is not a final and appealable order.” The existence of the contempt proceedings did not matter, the appellate court ruled, because the Browns appealed before an appealable contempt order was entered.

Wallace Leyshon was fired from his job for cause by Diehl Controls North America. Leyshon sued Diehl for, among other things, defamation. A jury awarded Leyshon $2 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages. Diehl asked the trial court to lower the punitive damages verdict, which it did, to $6 million.

Still unhappy, Diehl appealed. One of Diehl’s positions on appeal was that the punitive damages award was excessive. The question was whether Leyshon had sufficient facts at trial to support the punitive damages verdict. The First District Illinois Appellate Court first considered the standard of review: “As the jury’s determination of the amount of punitive damages is predominately a factual issue, the [appellate] court will not reverse the award unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”

In this case, there was evidence that Diehl’s actions were premeditated. So the appellate court affirmed the punitive damages award. Read the whole case, Leyshon v. Diehl Controls North America, No. 1-09-1848 (12/27/10).

Illinois has adopted public-domain citation for all cases filed on or after July 1, 2011. The Illinois Supreme Court has amended its Rule 6, which now also requires pinpoint citation to an assigned paragraph number. Your memorandum or brief may contain a citation to West’s North Eastern Reporter or Illinois Decisions, but those citations will be neither required nor alone sufficient. The official reporter — which we’re accustomed to citing as “Ill. 2d” or “Ill. App. 3d” — is going extinct for cases filed after July 1st.

So what’s a Westlaw researcher to do? A Westlaw telephone researcher reported the company is working on paginating in accord with the public domain versions. No word yet on when the new pagination will be available on Westlaw.

According to the revised Rule 6 comments, here’s how the new supreme court cite should look: People v. Doe, 2011 IL 10234. A pinpoint cite to an appellate court opinion should look like this: People v. Doe, 2011 IL App (1st) 101234, ¶ 15. The “1st” parenthetical refers to the First District Appellate Court, so newly filed appellate opinions will require reference to one of the five appellate court districts. (I wonder why. The Illinois appellate courts are a unified system. Each opinion, no matter which district issues it, should have equal precedential value.)

Firefighter Edward Lindemulder suffered from permanent, irreversible chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. The City of Naperville, Illinois put Lindemulder on medical leave because his COPD prevented him from performing the essential functions of his job.

Lindemulder applied for line-of-duty or occupational disease disability benefits. He claimed his COPD was caused or exacerbated by his exposure to diesel fumes at the fire station or to fire smoke.

The board denied Lindemulder’s request, but did award a non-duty pension. The board ruled “that any alleged on-duty incidents or exposures did not cause or contribute to plaintiff’s [Lindemulder’s] disability, which instead was caused by cigarette smoking.” Lindemulder requested review of the board’s decision. But the trial court agreed with the board, so Lindemulder appealed.

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