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Did you ever see those big signs draped over the front of a store proclaiming a Grand Re-Opening? I picture a short, bald shopkeeper, slightly bent at the waist from years of standing over the store counters, wearing a crisp white shirt, light gray-brown slacks, and suspenders, pushing metal security rails away from the front windows and doors. When the rails clear, the shopkeeper looks up at a sign over the door, wide grin commanding his face. He points with open hand to the sign, as if he wants to give it to you. The sign, of course, yells “Grand Re-Opening.”

Hey, wait a minute. That shopkeeper is me. (Except I’m much better looking, although I am pretty bald.) I always wanted to own one of those stores.

Anyway, I need a Re-Opening. I had a Grand Opening for this blog a few weeks ago. But now the design is greatly improved, and I’ve been submitted to the search engines. (Thanks to my pals at Justia, especially Tim Stanley and Stacy Stern, justia.com and onward.justia.com.) And I am just beginning to learn the utility and power of a blog. (Thanks to my friend, Mazyar Hedayat, who among other things, publishes a most excellent blog about law practice management at www.dcbalpm.wordpress.com, website at www.mha-law.com.)

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In a wrongful death case, plaintiff was awarded $2 million for loss of support and $25 million for loss of society. While the evidence showed a close family relationship, the verdict still shocked the judicial conscience and was ruled to be excessive.

The appellate court decided that remittitur was preferable to a new trial on damages because there were no trial errors and loss of consortium was warranted by the evidence. Rather than reach the new damage figure, the appellate court remanded to the trial court to revise the loss of consortium award. The appellate court gave minimal guidance to the trial court, stating, “[W]e would find it difficult to deem reasonable a loss of society award of more than seven figures in this case and would certainly find unreasonable an award of any more than one-half of the loss of society award settled upon by the jury.”

This opinion contains interesting discussion about the consumer expectations and risk utility tests, and the propriety of various jury instructions. Get the whole opinion, Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1-05-3133 (11/22/06), by clicking here.

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Ikama-Obambi, the daughter of an activist in an opposition party in the Republic of Congo, filed an application for asylum. But the application was filed more than one year after she entered the United States, thus violating the filing deadline. There are exceptions to the one-year rule for changed or extraordinary circumstances, but “Only the Attorney General … may decide whether an asylum application is timely or whether any exception to the deadline applies, and we [appellate court] lack jurisdiction to review these determinations.”

Ikama-Obambi’s petition for review was granted on other grounds. The court stated the immigration judge and the board of appeals “failed to make an explicit credibility finding, or even indicate why her testimony fails to carry her burden of proof …” The demand for corroborating evidence thus was improper.

See the whole case, Ikama-Obambi v. Gonzales, No. 06-1402 (12/11/06), right here (free account required).http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/7th/061402p.pdf

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The Bocis’ request for political asylum was denied by an immigration judge. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals denied a request for review.

There was evidence that the Boci home and business in Albania were burned down because of the Bocis’ political affiliation. But the 7th Circuit said that did not “satisfy a heavy evidentiary burden. Indeed, our standard of review is ‘difficult to meet without powerful and moving evidence.’” Nor did fear of future persecution, which the court termed as “subjective,” lay a basis for asylum.

The Bocis also asked for “withholding of removal” to Albania under the Convention Against Torture. The court denied that request because the Bocis did not demonstrate a clear probability they would face persecution in Albania. “Because the Bocis have provided little, if any, evidence of torture as defined by federal regulations [“severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental”], the record does not compel granting them relief under CAT.”

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A mother was found to be an unfit parent. In the best interest of her child, the mother’s parental rights were terminated. The mother appealed the unfitness finding. The State argued lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The Illinois First District appellate court agreed it did not have jurisdiction. Here’s the court’s thinking:

In juvenile cases, subject to Supreme Court Rule662(a) … an adjudicatory order is generally not considered a final appealable order … Rather, it is the dispositional order from which an appeal properly lies …

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Last week the ISBA sponsored a seminar on Effective Legal Writing. I was intrigued by the promo, which promised going beyond the usually drab basic stuff you can get from any decent style book. Greg Colomb, an English professor at the University of Virginia, taught the seminar. He did not disappoint. He was witty and thoughtful as we deciphered and rewrote samples of ineffective and effective writing.

The discussion about writing “flow” was particularly impressive. Greg emphasized two points.

1. Sentences are bundles of information. Readers understand longer, more complex information better when it arrives at the end of a sentence. The “architecture of a clear sentence” suggests placing short bundles of information before long bundles.

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A contractor obtained performance bonds for three construction projects. The surety company required the president and the owner to sign indemnity agreements to obtain the bonds. When the contractor defaulted on the construction contracts, the surety company became liable on the performance bonds. Using the indemnity agreements, the surety then sued the president and the owner to get the money back.

In the trial court, the president and the owner successfully argued for dismissal based on a four-year statute of limitations. The surety company argued that a 10-year statute applied.

Another option, a two-year limitations statute was not raised by the president or the owner in the trial court. But when the case went up on appeal, they claimed that the two-year statute applied. The surety argued waiver. But the court rejected the waiver argument because “the applicable limitations period was before the trial court,” albeit not the two-year statute. The appellate court indicated that waiver could be avoided as long as the factual basis for the argument — but not necessarily the argument itself — was before the trial court.

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Here are some fundamental lessons for practitioners from a recent First District Illinois retaliatory discharge case: (1) Make sure your post-trial motions are sufficiently detailed and specific enough to give the trial court a chance to correct its errors. (2) If you are challenging jury instructions, you’ll need the transcript of the jury instruction conference. (3) Just making a post-trial motion on the admission of evidence isn’t good enough to preserve your appeal. You must also object to the evidence at trial.

You can read about the employee’s difficulties on appeal in Webber v. Wight & Company, No. 1-04-1622 (11/9/06), by clicking here.

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Unfit to stand trial for telephone harassment, Leslie H. was admitted to the Elgin Mental Health Center. Her psychiatrist petitioned to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to her. A public defender represented her on the petition to administer the drugs. Leslie’s attorney in the criminal defense matter was not given notice of the psychiatrist’s petition.

The trial court granted the petition, and Leslie appealed. The Second District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the dispute was not moot, even though the waiting period after the order authorizing administration of the drugs passed. The court invoked the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. (Question of a public nature; authoritative ruling could help guide public officers; issue likely to recur.)

Because the public defender did not challenge the lack of notice to Leslie’s criminal defense lawyer at the hearing on the petition, the State argued waiver. The appellate court overlooked the waiver “in order to achieve a just result … especially in a case where the State seeks to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication.”

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