Illinois Appellate Lawyer Blog

June 4, 2007

Illinois Supreme Court Interpreting DOC Rule. Is It De Novo Or Is It Abuse Of Discretion?

A prison inmate filed a class action complaint against the Illinois Department of Corrections. He asserted that a co-payment charged to indigent inmates for non-emergency medical and dental services was improper. The issue was whether the DOC’s definition of “indigent” (unable to pay the co-payment for the entire time of incarceration) conflicted with Illinois’ Unified Code of Corrections.

The circuit court dismissed the complaint. But the appellate court reversed. Affirming the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court first considered the standard of review. The Supreme Court acknowledged the typical standard of review of a motion to dismiss is de novo. Further, “Whether plaintiff’s complaint was properly dismissed turns on whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged a certain and clearly ascertainable right that needs protection.’”

The standard of review gets clouded in this case because the Supreme Court also stated that the DOC’s interpretation of the Code of Corrections gets a deferential review. “We acknowledge that where, as here, an agency is charged with the administration and enforcement of the statute, courts will give deference to the agency’s interpretation of any statutory ambiguities.”

May 30, 2007

Trial Court Must Grant Extension Within 30 Days Of Judgment To Preserve Additional Time For Reconsideration Motion

by Steven R. Merican

The Singels were divorced in April 2006. Thirty days later, Thomas’s new lawyer filed a motion requesting an extension of time to file a motion to reconsider the dissolution judgment. That motion was denied in August. The trial court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction because neither a motion to reconsider had been filed nor an extension granted within 30 days of the dissolution judgment.

Thomas appealed that ruling in September, but Mary Beth fought appellate jurisdiction on the basis that the Notice of Appeal had not been filed within 30 days of the judgment. The appellate court agreed with Mary Beth and dismissed the appeal.

The Notice of Appeal clearly was filed more than 30 days after the judgment. So the disputed issue was whether Thomas’s motion for an extension of time to file the motion for reconsideration, which he filed within 30 days of the judgment, but was not ruled on until three months later, tolled the time to file a Notice of Appeal. The court ruled that Thomas’s motion did not extend the time to file; it had to be granted within that time.

May 29, 2007

May 07 Rulings On Motions For Rehearing

by Steven R. Merican

The Illinois Supreme Court denied five motions for rehearing in May 2007 and granted none. That makes it Denials 10, Grants 0 since March 2007.

May 28, 2007

Judicial Campaign Regulation Bill Advances To Illinois House

by Steven R. Merican

Earlier this month, SB 0222, the bill to regulate judicial campaigns by institutionalizing public funding for appellate and supreme court seats and limiting contributions to all candidates passed in the Illinois Senate. The vote was 46 to 12. Click here to see the vote.

The bill is pending in the House Executive Committee and has an action deadline of May 31, 2007. The House bill has a 22 sponsors .

The bill would provide funding for candidates of major parties who are running for the Illinois Appellate Court ($250,000) and the Illinois Supreme Court ($750,000). The bill also allots money to primary candidates who meet certain baseline support criteria. It also caps contributions by individuals to a judicial candidate (circuit court included) to $2,000 per election period.

May 25, 2007

Whether An Individual Is A “Political Committee” A Mixed Question Of Law And Fact

by Steven R. Merican

The Illinois State Board of Elections found that Victor Santana violated the state Election Code in connection with his financial support of a judicial candidate in a primary election. Santana did not file appropriate organizational or disclosure statements even though he paid in excess of $3,000 for a campaign mailing.

On direct appeal to the appellate court, Santana disputed that he was required to file the reports. The appellate court identified the standard of review of the Elections Board decision and attempted to define the contours of the standard:

This court reviews the decision of an administrative body as a “mixed question of law and fact,” on a “clearly erroneous” standard . . . A mixed question of law and fact involves an analysis of the application of the rule of law to the established facts; the ultimate determination is whether the rule of law is violated . . . The “clearly erroneous” standard is “significantly deferential” to administrative decisions and requires that an agency’s determination will be reversed “only where the reviewing court, on the entire record, is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed’ . . . The decision of an election board is subject to such deference . . .

May 24, 2007

Seventh Circuit Rules Attorney Lacks Standing To Appeal Negative Remarks

by Steven R. Merican

The parties reached a settlement of a Fair Housing Act claim that was filed in federal court in Illinois. But then the parties could not agree on the terms of the agreement, so cross motions to enforce an agreement were filed. The district court granted defendant’s motion, denied plaintiff’s motion, and criticized plaintiff and her attorney for not being honest about the settlement.

When the settlement was brought to the Surrogate Court in New York for a determination that plaintiff’s children were fairly represented, plaintiff said that none of the settlement was attributable to her children. That was contrary to the original settlement agreement.

Back in Illinois, the federal district court concluded that plaintiff and her attorneys made improper representations to the defendants and to the Surrogate Court. The district court then entered a new settlement agreement, which attributed part of the money to plaintiff’s children.

May 23, 2007

Illinois Supreme Court Refuses To Consider Argument That Is Not Fully Briefed

by Steven R. Merican

A student suffered a spinal cord injury when he used a mini-trampoline during a school extracurricular tumbling program. The student sued the board of education, the youth center, and the center’s instructor. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the first time it considered the case. But on rehearing, the supreme court reversed.

The student’s amended Complaint alleged a “failure to guard or warn of a dangerous condition” exception to the immunity defense. But the appellate court did not expressly address the propriety of the exception. The supreme court declined to address the question because “this issue was not fully briefed and argued . . .”

See the whole case, Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, No. 99457 (2/16/07), by clicking here.

May 22, 2007

Appellate Jurisdiction Doesn’t Necessarily Depend On Final Assessment Of Financial Award

by Steven R. Merican

In this appeal of a workers’ compensation award, the Fifth District Illinois Appellate Court considered its jurisdiction on its own prerogative. The jurisdictional question arose because the arbitrator did not assign an amount for temporary total disability. Usually, when the amount of an award is not set, there is no appellate jurisdiction. However, “If ascertaining the proper amount of the award involves a simple mathematical process, we do not lack jurisdiction . . . “

The arbitrator in this case neglected to set the amount of the award in his order. But he did determine the employee’s average weekly wage, his marital status, and the number of children he had. “Given the findings, determining the proper amount of the award for temporary total disability on remand is a simple mathematical process. Accordingly . . . we do not lack jurisdiction over this appeal.”

Get the whole case, St Elizabeth’s Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Comm’n., No. 05-06-0081 WC (2/21/07), by clicking here.

May 15, 2007

Fifth District Illinois Med Mal Case Addresses Waiver On Appeal

by Steven R. Merican

An appellate opinion from the Illinois Fifth District raises two waiver questions that are notable for appellate practitioners. The case grows from Joyce Cretton’s treatment at Memorial Hospital of Belleville. She was admitted already with advanced stage chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. She died about two weeks later. Her estate sued the hospital, alleging that she “had been allowed to fall or was dropped and that as a result Joyce suffered a subdural hematoma that ultimately resulted in her death.”

After trial, a jury (1) awarded the estate just under $1 million on a survival action, and (2) found in favor of defendant on the wrongful death claim. A sanction of nearly $130,000 was entered against the hospital. The hospital appealed the jury award and the sanction. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the verdict and the sanction.

The following waiver issues are notable:

May 14, 2007

Second District Illinois Appellate Dismisses Appeal By Non-Party Police Department

by Steven R. Merican

The Department of State Police denied Daniel Braglia a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card (FOID). Seeking reversal of that decision, pursuant to statute, Braglia sued the county state’s attorney’s office. His complaint did not make the State Police a party. Braglia requested, and received, an order directing the State Police Department to issue the FOID card. The State Police moved to vacate the order. When that motion was denied, the State Police appealed.

The State Police argued the trial court’s order was void because the Police Department was not named in Braglia’s complaint nor served with summons. On the other hand, Braglia claimed that the Police Department had no standing to appeal because it was not party to the original trial court proceeding. So Braglia moved to dismiss the appeal.

The appellate court granted the motion to dismiss. The court ruled that the State Police Department was not a necessary party because its function in issuing the FOID card was merely ministerial. The Department was no better suited than the State’s Attorney’s office to represent the public’s interest in the matter. The court concluded that the State Police Department lacked any interest that is “direct, immediate, and substantial and that would be prejudiced by the judgment or would benefit from reversal.”