Priscilla Rosolowski was the named plaintiff in a class-action lawsuit against Clark Refining and Marketing. The class consisted of residents who lived near Clark’s oil refinery. They claimed the refinery was a nuisance.

A first trial judge certified the class. A second trial judge denied Clark’s motion to decertify the class. Clark tried again for decertification, but a third judge, the one who tried the case, denied Clark’s motion.

A trial resulted in a $120 million verdict against Clark, $40 million of it for punitive damages. Clark then filed motions to vacate the judgment, for a new trial, and for decertification of the class. One year later, the trial court granted Clark’s motions.

Tanisha Ruffin, on behalf of her infant daughter Sonya, sued Dr. Leo Boler for malpractice during Sonya’s delivery. Ruffin claimed Boler’s negligence caused Sonya to be born with an injury to her brachial plexus nerve network located at the shoulder area.

The case was tried to a jury, which ruled in favor of Boler. Ruffin asked for a new trial because Boler’s expert, a biomedical, biomechanical engineer, was allowed to testify. The trial court (a new judge) agreed that Boler’s expert should have been barred, and granted the new trial. Boler appealed.

The admission of novel scientific evidence in Illinois courts is governed by the Frye standard. (“… admissible at trial only if the methodology or scientific principle upon which the opinion is based is ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’”)

Illinois Solicitor General Michael Scodro will be the featured speaker at The Illinois Appellate Lawyers Association’s September 2008 lunch meeting. Scodro will talk about amicus briefs.

The meeting will be on September 26, 2008 at the Chicago Bar Association, 321 S. Plymouth Court, Chicago, Illinois. Reception starts at noon. Luncheon at 12:30 p.m. Cost is $30 for members, $35 for non-members.

Call the Association, 847-885-2410, or email, aeller@association-resources.com for a reservation.

David Loman owned a race horse that he brought to the College of Venterinary Medicine at the University of Illinois for treatment. David Freeman performed surgery on the horse. But Loman said the surgery left the horse unable to race. So Loman sued Freeman.

Loman’s claims for negligence and conversion were dismissed by the trial court. The appellate court reversed and reinstated Loman’s complaint. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court.

Freeman asserted that the Moorman Doctrine (economic damages — i.e., contract damages — not available in a tort action) blocked Loman’s negligence case. But first there was the question of whether Freeman forfeited the Moorman defense in the Illinois Supreme Court.

Efrain Torres injured his shoulder when he slipped on property owned by Midwest Development Company. Torres sued Midwest, claiming the company caused an unnatural accumulation of ice on the property. Michael Eiben, Torres’s roofing expert, was barred from testifying at trial, because, the trial court ruled, Eiben had “no rational basis for his opinions.”

After a jury verdict in favor of Midwest, Torres appealed. He argued that Eiben should have been allowed to tell the jury his opinions about ice damming and proper roof construction. That raised the question of whether plaintiff’s failure to make an offer of proof to the trial judge resulted in waiver of the argument that Eiben should have been permitted to testify.

The First District Illinois Appellate Court ruled there was no waiver. The court acknowledged that “when a trial court refuses evidence, no appealable issue remains unless a formal offer of proof is made.”

Ahmad Khorrami claimed he was wrongfully detained and mistreated by the federal government in an investigation stemming from the 9/11 terrorist attack. Khorrami sued Michael Rolince, an FBI agent on whose affidavit Khorrami allegedly was detained, and the government. The lawsuit alleged multiple causes of action, including one against Rolince — Khorrami claimed Rolince’s affidavit was false — for violation of Fifth Amendment due process rights.

The government moved to dismiss the complaint (1) for failure to state a claim and (2) arguing that Rolince had qualified immunity for his affidavit. The trial court granted all aspects of the motion, except that it declined to rule on the government’s claim for qualified immunity. The government brought an interlocutory appeal, arguing there was qualified immunity and that the whole case should have been dismissed.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. Because the immunity defense was postponed for later ruling by trial court, and not specifically ruled upon, there was not an order rejecting the immunity defense, which was a requirement for appeal. In addition, this was not a de facto denial of the immunity defense caused by a delay in ruling. The order setting aside the immunity ruling did not have a direct or irreparable impact on the merits of the case.

Jerry Walker suffered a personal injury when she fell while cruising on a Carnival Cruise Line ship. She sued Carnival in Illinois, but her ticket stated that disputes must be litigated in Miami, Florida. Carnival sought dismissal of Jerry’s lawsuit, arguing that Illinois was not the proper forum. The Illinois trial court ruled that the forum-selection provision on Jerry’s ticket was unenforceable, and denied Carnival’s motion.

Because an order denying a motion to dismiss is not final and appealable, Carnival asked for permission to appeal. The trial court allowed the interlocutory appeal, and, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308, certified the following question for the appellate court to answer: “Whether the trial court erred in its application of law pertaining to its denial of Carnival’s … motion to dismiss …”

Rule 308 interlocutory appeals are allowed when the trial court certifies “a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and where an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” The First District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the question certified by the trial court was not a proper Rule 308 question.

Stoneridge Development Company built a townhouse for John and Marie Walski. The Walskis claimed the house suffered from structural defects caused by Stoneridge building on soil that was not compacted appropriately. After the Walskis sued Stoneridge, Stoneridge sued Essex Insurance Company, its general liability insurer, for insurance coverage for the Walskis lawsuit.

The trial court ruled that Essex had an undisclosed conflict of interest, was therefore prevented from denying coverage, and entered summary judgment for Stoneridge. Essex appealed, but Stoneridge asked the appeal to be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The trial court had written an opinion letter in July stating how it intended to rule and directing the parties to draft an order granting the summary judgment. Essex filed a motion to reconsider after that opinion letter was written, but before the judgment was entered. When the judgment in Stoneridge’s favor was entered, the trial court also entered and continued Essex’s motion to reconsider.

Howard Berry sued 40-plus companies for his damages from contracting mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos. He died before his discovery deposition was completed and before his evidence deposition was taken. Howard’s wife, Linnie, continued the lawsuit as representative of Howard’s estate.

The companies moved to bar the use of Howard’s discovery deposition at trial. The trial court granted the motion because, with few exceptions, Illinois law does not allow the discovery deposition of a party, even though unavailable, to be read into evidence. The companies then moved for summary judgment on the basis that Howard’s estate could not prove its case without Howard’s testimony. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment against the estate.

Linnie appealed. The estate argued, among other things, that Howard’s discovery deposition was a “dying declaration,” and could come into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. The Fifth District Illinois Appellate Court disagreed. The appellate court stated the standard of review for “determination of whether a particular statement constitutes a dying declaration … [is whether the court’s] findings are palpably contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” The discovery deposition was not a dying declaration because the estate did not show that Howard thought his death was imminent at the time he gave the deposition.

Insurer CNA was involved in a complicated dispute with a claim handling company, Staffing Concepts. Staffing Concepts made claims on the worker compensation policies that it bought from CNA. CNA claimed that Staffing Concepts refused to pay millions of dollars for the deductibles on claims made by its employees.

There was a related dispute between Staffing Concepts and ClaimPlus, a company that serviced claims made by the Staffing Concepts employees. ClaimPlus asserted that Staffing Concepts did not pay the claim handling fee. So ClaimPlus filed an arbitration claim against Staffing Concepts.

Staffing Concepts then moved to transfer CNA’s case from Illinois to Florida. Some of the Staffing Concepts affiliates, also defendants in the case, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. CNA in turn asked the court to stay the case, and to put the Staffing Concepts’ motions on hold, pending the outcome of the arbitration between ClaimPlus and Staffing Concepts.

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