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Tommy Hardin had been convicted of aggravated sexual crimes three times. Just before his mandatory supervised release period, the State petitioned for Hardin’s civil commitment under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act.

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled there was no probable cause to believe Hardin was a sexually violent person who was likely to re- offend. So a trial on the State’s commitment petition was not held, and the court ordered Hardin to be released and placed on supervision.

The State appealed the finding of no probable cause. Hardin asked the appellate court to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. He argued alternative reasons: (1) the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act does not authorize the State to appeal a finding of no probable cause; (2) the order in this case was not final and appealable. The Second District Illinois Appellate Court denied Hardin’s request to dismiss, and reversed the trial court’s finding of no probable cause.

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Andrea Coleman sued Christina Udoh and her husband, Nsikak Akpakpan, for violating the Chicago Residential Landlords and Tenants Ordinance. The case was arbitrated, and Coleman was awarded $20,600. The trial court barred Udoh and Akpakpan from rejecting the arbitration award, so they appealed.

Representing herself, Udoh filed her own notice of appeal. She did not write Akpakpan’s name on the notice. Nor did he file his own notice of appeal. Coleman claimed there was no appellate jurisdiction to hear Akpakpan’s appeal. The First District Illinois Appellate Court agreed. Here’s the appellate court’s explanation:

Where the notice of appeal clearly names only one party as appellant, the court considers the appeal to be taken only by the named party … In the absence of a separate notice of appeal filed by Mr. Mr. Akpakpan and the failure of the notice of appeal filed by Ms. Udoh to name him as an appellant and to include his signature or the signature and address of his attorney [required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(4)], Mr. Akpakpan is not a party to this appeal. We will consider this appeal only as to Ms. Udoh, and the judgment against Mr. Akpakpan will not be affected by its outcome.

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Clarence Domingo sued the builder of his house, Vito Guarino, for breach of contract and violation of the Illinois consumer fraud act. Clarence got a default judgment, which Vito tried to get vacated under Illinois Code of Civil Procedure § 2-1401. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Vito’s request, then refused to vacate the judgment. So Vito appealed.

The first issue on appeal was the proper standard of review. The Second District Illinois Appellate Court acknowledged a split among courts on the question, then threw its hat on the side of the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard.

The whole opinion, Domingo v. Guarino, No. 2-09-0852 (6/25/10), is available by clicking here.

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Bernstein and Grazian had a falling out, so they folded their law practice. Grazian started his own firm, and took some cases with him from the firm he had with Bernstein. The two lawyers fought over how much each should be paid for those files. Bernstein sued Grazian, who countersued Bernstein. Unhappy with the result in the trial court, Bernstein appealed. Grazian filed a counter appeal.

Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 309, Bernstein asked the trial court to dismiss his appeal. The trial court obliged, but Bernstein told the appellate court his request to dismiss his appeal was a mistake. He asked the appellate court to reinstate his appeal. A single judge of the appellate court obliged that request . But Grazian asserted the earlier dismissal by the trial court deprived the appellate court of jurisdiction to reinstate the appeal.

The First District Illinois Appellate Court agreed with Grazian. Here is the court’s rationale:

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Wanda Boone died after her surgeon did not remove a cancerous tumor from her colon during a first surgery. The tumor was removed during a second surgery five days later. Wanda’s estate sued the surgeon, James Boffa, for medical malpractice, claiming Wanda died from the stress of the second surgery.

After trial, a jury found in favor of Dr. Boffa. The jury’s finding was a general verdict – i.e., the jury was not asked, and did not say, what defense theory it relied upon.

Dr. Boffa had two theories of defense. The First District Illinois Appellate Court rejected one of those theories — that there was another sole proximate cause for Wanda’s death — for lack of evidence. Wanda’s estate argued that the general verdict for Dr. Boffa therefore should be reversed.

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Leland Stahelin and JES Ventures owned property that bordered the Morton Arboretum in DuPage County, Illinois. The county forest preserve and the arboretum wanted to preserve the property in its undeveloped state. After purchase negotiations failed, the forest preserve sued the owners in a condemnation suit, then withdrew the suit. At the same time, the forest preserve passed an ordinance that stated “the acquisition of the property in the future would be important to furthering the statutory purposes of the [District].”

The owners claimed they could not develop the property for commercial purposes because the ordinance stated the government’s intention to condemn it. So the owners sued the forest preserve and the arboretum under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for engaging in a conspiracy to take the land. The trial court dismissed that lawsuit. The arboretum then asked the trial court to award attorney fees. Meanwhile, the owners appealed the dismissal, but the appellate court affirmed. The owners’ petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was denied. The arboretum then asked for an award of its attorney fees incurred in defending the owners’ appeal.

The trial court awarded the arboretum its fees under Section 1988 [federal civil rights statute] for defending the appeal, but not for defending the case in the trial court. The owners then appealed the award of attorney fees.

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An honest man? Nah, that’d take too long.

But I am looking for a great strategist and brief writer who wants to write criminal law appeals.

Call (630-579-6460) or email (steve.merican@gmail.com) if you’re interested.

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The beneficiaries of the Victoria R. Fitch Trust sued McDermott Will and Emery, the law firm that drafted Victoria’s estate plan, and Dietrich and Dietrich, the accounting firm that advised Victoria. The beneficiaries alleged a variety of legal claims for mishandling the estate plan.

The first count of the Complaint was against Dietrich only. The second count was against Dietrich and McDermott. The third was against McDermott only. The trial court dismissed all three counts because they were not filed before the statute of limitations expired.

The beneficiaries appealed. But their Notice of Appeal stated only that they were appealing the dismissals of Counts I and II against Dietrich. The Notice of Appeal did not mention Counts II and III against McDermott.

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This is an important Illinois case inasmuch as it has generated one of just a handful of appellate opinions that deal directly with the law as applied to internet use and political speech.

Donald Maxon claimed he was defamed by comments posted by unidentified members of the public on a web version of the Times, a newspaper published by Ottawa Publishing Company. Certain unedited comments, Maxon felt, accused him of bribing city council members in return for a favorable vote on a city ordinance.

Ottawa Publishing knew the identities of the commenters, who wrote anonymously on the internet page. Maxon wanted to sue the commenters. To find out whom they were, Maxon filed a petition under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224 [allowing pre-trial discovery “for the sole purpose of ascertaining the identity of one who may be responsible in damages …”] demanding Ottawa Publishing to identify the commenters.

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This opinion is useful because it reiterates the point that a favorable pre-trial evidentiary ruling may not be sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal if your opposing counsel violates the ruling at trial. You must object at trial when the evidence is offered.

In this medical malpractice case, the defendant and a non-party witness testified that the aggrieved patient wanted to continue the allegedly negligent medical treatment despite reported problems. On appeal, the patient argued the testimony violated a pre-trial order that prohibited “testimony that Ms. Hardy [plaintiff] was comparatively negligent.” Unfortunately for Ms. Hardy, she neither objected to the testimony nor moved to strike it.

The Third District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that Ms. Hardy forfeited appeal of the argument. Here’s what the court said:

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