Articles Posted in Standard of Review

This doesn’t come up often, but the rule is good to keep tucked away for when you need it. In this medical malpractice case, the question on appeal involved the trial court’s actions after an earlier remand from the appellate court. The First District Illinois Court of Appeals stated the scope and standard of review. “After a remand, the circuit court is required to exercise its discretion within the bounds of the remand … Whether it has done so is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.”

Read the whole case, Garley v. Columbia LaGrange Hospital, No. 1-06-2908 (12/5/07), by clicking here.

Ozma Tabassum sued Javed Younis were married in Canada and had one child, Azra. They moved to Illinois, where their relationship took a turn for the worse. Ozma took Azra back to her family in Canada. While in Canada, Ozma and Javed negotiated a postmarital agreement. Ozma agreed not to file for divorce. In return, Javed agreed to end his extra-marital affair. Javed also agreed that if Ozma did file for divorce — which would happen if Javed did not uphold his part of the agreement — then Ozma would get the house, and it would be considered nonmarital property.

Ozma sued for divorce in Illinois. But the trial court ruled that the postmarital agreement was invalid and that the house was marital property. In reversing these rulings, the Second District Illinois Court of Appeals considered the questions of procedural and substantive unconscionability of a postmarital contract, and the proper standards of review in the appellate court.

The appellate court first considered procedural unconscionability. “A contract is procedurally unconscionable if an impropriety in the process of forming the contract deprived a party of a meaningful choice … The trial court found that the postmarital agreement was procedurally unconscionable largely on the basis that petitioner was in Canada with Azra while the parties were negotiating the terms of the postmarital agreement, ‘the implicit threat being that unless agreement was reached she and Azra would remain in Canada, reducing if not eliminating [respondent’s] ability to meaningfully parent.’ This statement equates to a finding that respondent was under duress during the negotiation of the agreement. Duress may make an agreement between spouses unconscionable.”

In Boyd v. City of Chicago, No. 1-06-0358 (12/5/08), the trial court precluded testimony of a fact witness. In Boyd’s appeal of an adverse jury verdict, he claimed the trial court improperly precluded his witness’s testimony as a discovery sanction.

The appellate court identified the standard of review: “ Whether a party violated a discovery rule is an issue of law that we review de novo”. But is this really a question of law? The determination about a violation of a statute seems like a question of fact. The appellate court identified the considerations to impose a sanction, and all six of them are fact questions. So whether a party violated the discovery rule should be a question of fact reviewed under a discretionary standard.

Affirming certification of a class of plaintiffs who allegedly were overcharged by a moving company, the First District Illinois Court of Appeals stated the standard of review for class certification: “‘The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a proposed class satisfies the requirements for class certification and should err in favor of maintaining class [certifications].’ … ‘The trial court’s certification of a class will be disturbed only upon a clear abuse of discretion or an application of impermissible legal criteria.’”

The court described “abuse of discretion” (“arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would take the same view”), but did not state whether “clear abuse of discretion” called for anything more.

Get the whole opinion, Ramirez v. Midway Moving and Storage, Inc., No. 1-07-0997 (12/11/07), by clicking here.

While assisting an arrest, Police Officer Lawrence Wade got into a scuffle with the prisoner. Wade injured his knee, which required surgery. Ultimately, his doctor declared that Wade could not return to full patrol duty. The Police Department did not have an inside position for him, so Wade’s options were to retire or apply for a disability pension.

Officer Wade applied for the pension. But the City of North Chicago Police Pension Board denied Wade a line-of-duty pension, ruling essentially that one doctor’s opinion [Milgram] that Wade “did not incur a disability from the performance of an act of duty” was more persuasive than the four whose opinions were otherwise.

The circuit court confirmed the board, and the court of appeals affirmed. The first time the Illinois Supreme Court got the case, it issued a supervisory order for the appellate court to reassess in view of recent supreme court rulings. The appellate court again affirmed the denial of the pension, although it did rule that Milgram’s opinion was not credible. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, and sent the matter back to the pension board to award Officer Wade a pension.

A pension fund sued a partnership under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, an amendment to ERISA, to recover an outstanding liability. The pension fund obtained summary judgment, and the partnership appealed.

The standard of review was brought into question. Typically, summary judgments, including in ERISA cases, are reviewed de novo. But the Seventh Circuit has “held that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies when the only issue before the district court is the characterization of undisputed subsidiary facts and where a party does not have the right to a jury trial.”

In this case, the appellate court ruled that the partnership was not entitled to a jury trial under the MPPAA, so the correct standard of review was the more deferential “clearly erroneous.”

Katherine Bergman’s baby died during child birth. She sued the doctor and the hospital for medical malpractice. Katherine got a verdict for more than $1.5 million. The doctor appealed, and among other things, claimed he was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict (jnov). The First District Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the judgment.

This opinion points to an important inconsistency in appeals from jury verdicts. The court identified the standard of review of a denial of a motion jnov: de novo review.

On his motion jnov, the doctor asserted “that there was no basis for plaintiff’s theory that the standard of care required Dr. Kelsey [defendant doctor] to give plaintiff antibiotics upon admission to the hospital.” There was conflicting expert testimony on this issue. Affirming the jury verdict, the appellate court stated: “This conflicting evidence regarding the standard of care for administering antibiotics was properly submitted to the jury, and this court will not usurp the function of the jury and substitute its judgment for that of the jury.”