Articles Posted in Appellate Jurisdiction

A senatorial candidate sued a columnist and a newspaper for libel. The trial court dismissed the case, and the candidate appealed. After the appeal was filed, the candidate voluntarily dismissed the columnist, but maintained the appeal against the newspaper. A mandate was issued with respect to the dismissal of the columnist.

Two years passed after the briefs were filed, but there still was no decision from the appellate court. In response to the candidate’s motion to set the case for oral argument, the newspaper asserted that the issuance of the mandate deprived the appellate court of jurisdiction. The appellate court would have none of it, and ruled that the mandate as to the columnist did not deny the court of jurisdiction to consider the appeal against the newspaper.

Pointing to the two-year period after briefing was completed, the newspaper also argued that laches and estoppel, and the candidate’s lack of diligence, prevented the court from considering the appeal. The appellate court rejected that argument. The court admitted that the case improperly had been removed from the active docket, resulting in the delay. “The plaintiff is not to blame for the delay in the disposition of this appeal. We will not avoid consideration of the merits of this appeal predicated upon delay caused by this court.”

Strategic Energy asked the Illinois Commerce Commission for authority to act as an alternative retail electrical supplier (ARES). The electrical workers union opposed Strategic, and over Strategic’s objection was allowed to intervene. The Commission ultimately granted Strategic’s application to operate as an ARES. All parties appealed, and moved to dismiss the others’ appeals.

Unhappy with the ruling allowing the union to intervene, Strategic filed a petition for direct review in the Second District Court of Appeals. The union and the Commission moved to dismiss that appeal on the basis that Strategic did not exhaust its administrative remedies. The first time the Second District ruled, it denied the motions to dismiss.

The union and the Commission filed their appeal of the ruling granting Strategic’s application. They filed their appeal in the Fifth District Court of Appeals. The Fifth District clerk transferred those appeals to the Second District, where they were consolidated with Strategic’s appeal. Strategic moved to dismiss them as a nullity, having been filed in the wrong appellate district.

Two defendants had nearly identical names. One was Town of Fort Sheridan Company (TFSC); the other was Town of Fort Sheridan Operating Company (TFSOC). Plaintiff originally sued TFSC only. Later, but without leave of court, plaintiff filed an amended complaint that additionally named TFSOC.

TFSOC moved to dismiss on the basis that the amended complaint was a nullity because leave to file it had not been granted. The trial court granted the motion, but the order mistakenly identified TFSC as the dismissed party. This order did contain Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) language, giving the parties 30 days to appeal the interlocutory order.

At TSFOC’s request, an order later was entered to correctly identify TSFOC as the dismissed party. That order was nunc pro tunc to the original dismissal order. It did not contain Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) language.

Richard Magley gave security interests to secure a number of loans. The Small Business Administration was guarantor of some of the loans, including two advanced by Cadleway Properties and Ossian Bank. The SBA removed the entire dispute to federal court. Cadleway and Ossian both claimed to be the beneficiary of a guaranty of a loan on a certain property. On summary judgment, the federal district court ruled that the bank was the beneficiary. The district court did not rule how much money, if anything, Ossian was entitled to receive.

The appellate court ruled that the dispute between Cadleway and Ossian was not “sufficiently discrete” to create an appealable interlocutory order. Here’s the court’s explanation:

. . . [T]he district judge has not specified who is entitled to what relief.

Andrew Sallenger suffered from mental illness. He resisted an arrest and died during the altercation with police. His estate sued the police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including a claim for use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The police officers lost their summary judgment motion that was based on qualified immunity. Then they appealed. The estate moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. It argued that the appeal sought review of the district court’s findings of fact, impermissible under the collateral order doctrine.

Denials of summary judgment motions based on qualified immunity typically are treated as final judgments and are immediately appealable. This exception to the final judgment rule exists because of “the urgency of denials of qualified immunity.” However, the exception is limited by another rule: “[T]he Court of Appeals may consider only issues of law and may not consider any case which raises a genuine issue of material fact on appeal.”

In Sallenger’s case, district court found that questions of material fact existed about whether excessive force was used, and denied the summary judgment motion. But on appeal, the police officers accepted the district court’s version of the facts for summary judgment purposes. The court thus ruled that it had appellate jurisdiction because it could “decide qualified immunity as a matter of law without review of the district court’s findings of facts.”

Luis Padilla was a lawful permanent resident. He pleaded guilty to charges of criminal sexual abuse and obstruction of justice in Illinois. He left the U.S., and when he attempted to return in May 2000 the federal government began removal proceedings because of his criminal record. Those proceedings concluded in February 2004 when the Bureau of Immigration Appeals ordered Padilla’s removal to Mexico.

After an unsuccessful appeal of that order, Padilla was ordered to report for removal in May 2005. But just before that time, Padilla got the Illinois criminal convictions vacated. He then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus and asked that he be declared admissible to the United States. Padilla did not ask the BIA to reconsider its order of removal.

The district court denied Padilla’s habeas petition, and he was removed to Mexico. He appealed the denial of the petition. Meanwhile, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which stripped federal district courts of jurisdiction to review final orders of removal by the BIA. The Seventh Circuit thus declared the district court proceedings a nullity, and took Padilla’s appeal as a petition for review of the BIA’s removal order.

A condominium association sued the condo developer for an accounting of expenses incurred before turnover to the board. The trial court granted summary judgment to the developer and denied the association’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The association appealed from the summary judgment given to the developer, but did not file a Notice of Appeal from the denial of its own summary judgment motion. Nonetheless, the association asked the appellate court to reverse the developer’s summary judgment and to order that judgment be entered for the association.

The developer argued that the association’s failure to file a Notice of Appeal from the denial of its own summary judgment motion “precludes us [appellate court] from granting the relief requested by the Association in its briefs.” Rejecting the developer’s argument, the court stated:

The notice of appeal in the instant case identifies the order appealed from, specifying that it granted summary judgment in favor of Metro. We recognize that the notice does not specify that the order appealed from also denied the Association’s motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, we recognize that the notice does not expressly seek reversal of that denial. Despite these omissions, we find that the notice fairly and adequately advised Metro of the nature of the appeal. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment clearly addressed the same legal issues, and thus, appealing the grant of one of the motions was essentially the same thing as appealing the denial of the other. Metro does not assert that it was prejudiced by the Association’s notice of appeal, and we find no basis for concluding that Metro’s ability to defend itself on appeal was in any way compromised or prejudiced by the formal, nonsubstantive defects in the Association’s notice of appeal.

Ikama-Obambi, the daughter of an activist in an opposition party in the Republic of Congo, filed an application for asylum. But the application was filed more than one year after she entered the United States, thus violating the filing deadline. There are exceptions to the one-year rule for changed or extraordinary circumstances, but “Only the Attorney General … may decide whether an asylum application is timely or whether any exception to the deadline applies, and we [appellate court] lack jurisdiction to review these determinations.”

Ikama-Obambi’s petition for review was granted on other grounds. The court stated the immigration judge and the board of appeals “failed to make an explicit credibility finding, or even indicate why her testimony fails to carry her burden of proof …” The demand for corroborating evidence thus was improper.

See the whole case, Ikama-Obambi v. Gonzales, No. 06-1402 (12/11/06), right here (free account required).http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/7th/061402p.pdf