Articles Posted in Appellate Jurisdiction

This case involved a dispute over the proceeds of a judgment debtor’s property. Certain of the creditors moved to allocate the proceeds of the sale of the property. The trial court denied the allocation motion.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307 allows orders granting or denying injunctive relief to be appealed within 30 days, as an interlocutory appeal. But the creditors who lost the allocation motion did not appeal within that deadline. They did timely appeal at the conclusion of the case. The issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to consider the appeal that did not comply with Rule 307.

The appellate court ruled that Rule 307 gave parties the option of appealing right away, but did not mandate an interlocutory appeal. “ . . . [W]hile Rule 307(a)(1) confers on parties the right to appeal certain interlocutory orders before entry of final judgment, the rule does not require that such an interlocutory appeal must be taken . . . Rather, the party has the option of waiting until after final judgment has been entered before seeking review of the interlocutory order . . .”

The Singels were divorced in April 2006. Thirty days later, Thomas’s new lawyer filed a motion requesting an extension of time to file a motion to reconsider the dissolution judgment. That motion was denied in August. The trial court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction because neither a motion to reconsider had been filed nor an extension granted within 30 days of the dissolution judgment.

Thomas appealed that ruling in September, but Mary Beth fought appellate jurisdiction on the basis that the Notice of Appeal had not been filed within 30 days of the judgment. The appellate court agreed with Mary Beth and dismissed the appeal.

The Notice of Appeal clearly was filed more than 30 days after the judgment. So the disputed issue was whether Thomas’s motion for an extension of time to file the motion for reconsideration, which he filed within 30 days of the judgment, but was not ruled on until three months later, tolled the time to file a Notice of Appeal. The court ruled that Thomas’s motion did not extend the time to file; it had to be granted within that time.

In this appeal of a workers’ compensation award, the Fifth District Illinois Appellate Court considered its jurisdiction on its own prerogative. The jurisdictional question arose because the arbitrator did not assign an amount for temporary total disability. Usually, when the amount of an award is not set, there is no appellate jurisdiction. However, “If ascertaining the proper amount of the award involves a simple mathematical process, we do not lack jurisdiction . . . “

The arbitrator in this case neglected to set the amount of the award in his order. But he did determine the employee’s average weekly wage, his marital status, and the number of children he had. “Given the findings, determining the proper amount of the award for temporary total disability on remand is a simple mathematical process. Accordingly . . . we do not lack jurisdiction over this appeal.”

Get the whole case, St Elizabeth’s Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Comm’n., No. 05-06-0081 WC (2/21/07), by clicking here.

The Department of State Police denied Daniel Braglia a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card (FOID). Seeking reversal of that decision, pursuant to statute, Braglia sued the county state’s attorney’s office. His complaint did not make the State Police a party. Braglia requested, and received, an order directing the State Police Department to issue the FOID card. The State Police moved to vacate the order. When that motion was denied, the State Police appealed.

The State Police argued the trial court’s order was void because the Police Department was not named in Braglia’s complaint nor served with summons. On the other hand, Braglia claimed that the Police Department had no standing to appeal because it was not party to the original trial court proceeding. So Braglia moved to dismiss the appeal.

The appellate court granted the motion to dismiss. The court ruled that the State Police Department was not a necessary party because its function in issuing the FOID card was merely ministerial. The Department was no better suited than the State’s Attorney’s office to represent the public’s interest in the matter. The court concluded that the State Police Department lacked any interest that is “direct, immediate, and substantial and that would be prejudiced by the judgment or would benefit from reversal.”

In a third amended complaint alleging five causes of action, Time Savers sued LaSalle Bank for breach of contract, fraud, and the like. The trial court granted LaSalle’s motion to dismiss. Although the order disposed of the entire complaint, it nonetheless contained language from Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) that permits appeal of an interlocutory order. (“. . . no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of this order.”) Time Savers appealed the dismissal. After the Notice of Appeal was filed, LaSalle filed a motion in the trial court for sanctions against Time Savers.

Despite the pending sanctions motion, the appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear Time Savers’ appeal of the dismissal order. Oddly, the appellate court pointed to the Rule 304(a) language — which was not necessary to the order of dismissal because that order disposed of the entire case — as saving jurisdiction. “We retain jurisdiction, despite the filing of the motion for sanctions, because the notice of appeal was filed from the January 25, 2006 order [dismissing the third amended complaint], which contained Supreme Court Rule 304(a) language . . . that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal.”

The entire case, Time Savers v. LaSalle Bank, No. 2-06-0198 (2/28/07), is available by clicking here.

Dawn Waddick was unhappy with the trial court’s decision in her divorce action. She moved for reconsideration of the court’s decision. Still unhappy with the result of that motion, she appealed the trial court’s decision.

The Second District Illinois Appellate Court dismissed the appeal on its own motion. The court distinguished between the trial court’s “decision” and the later-entered judgment. “. . . [W]hen a timely postjudgment motion has been filed, the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order disposing of the postjudgment motion. Here, however, Dawn’s motion to reconsider does not qualify as a timely postjudgment motion . . . Although Dawn’s motion to reconsider was file within 30 days after the trial court’s written decision, it was filed before the entry of the final judgment. Accordingly, the motion could not extend the time for filing the notice of appeal.”

The whole opinion, IRMO Waddick, No. 2-06-0363, is available by clicking here.

The Carillos had a particularly difficult divorce case. Nine days before a judgment was entered, Carlos filed a motion for a rule to show cause why Anna should not be held in contempt of court. The judgment resolved all issues concerning custody and distribution of marital assets.

The motion for a rule was not resolved until five months later, when the court denied it. Carlos appealed within 30 days of the order on the rule, asking for review of the judgment. Anna moved to dismiss the appeal of the judgment. She argued that the pending motion for a rule did not change Carlos’s obligation to appeal the judgment within 30 days of the time it was entered. Because Carlos waited for the court to rule on the pending motion for a rule, Anna maintained, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the appeal of the judgment.

The First District Appellate Court ruled that it did have jurisdiction to consider the judgment. “Because the order of January 18 [the judgment] lacked language making it immediately appealable, it did not become appealable until the court entered its July 11 order denying the motion for a rule to show cause.”

Scott and Debra, co-trustees of their late mother’s trust, could not get along. After motions by each to have the other removed, Debra requested that a “special administrator” (more accurately, a “trustee”) be appointed. Her motion was granted on March 10, 2006. The court named Kathleen Ryding the trustee, “until further order of court.”

Unhappy that Kathleen was named trustee, Scott appealed. But he didn’t file a notice of appeal until May 31, 2006, well more than 30 days after Kathleen was appointed. The Second District Illinois Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction over the untimely filed notice of appeal.

Two points in the opinion are important.

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated the rules regarding civil contempt orders are appealable interlocutory orders. The court ruled:

• “An order holding a litigant in contempt of court is not appealable while the litigation continues.”

• Resolution [of the contempt order] must await the final decision in the litigation. When the disobeyed order would be independently appealable under an exception to the final-decision rule, then the contempt citation also may be appealable.”

Bobby Lee Harrison was awaiting trial on charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault. He was unhappy with the trial judge, so he moved for substitution, claiming the judge was biased against him. The motion was denied, and Harrison appealed.

The First District Appellate Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The court ruled that the order denying the substitution motion was not final and appealable. “The denial of a motion for substitution of judge is not a final order . . . Rather, it has been described as ‘a step in the procedural progression leading to’ judgment.”

The whole opinion, People v. Harrison, 1-07-0732 (3/21/07), is available by clicking here.